Suchergebnisse

In diesem theoretischen Aufsatz werden Entscheidungsmodelle diskutiert, die zur Optimierung wirtschaftlicher Entscheidungen in durch Normenkonflikte gekennzeichneten Entscheidungssituationen beitragen können. Nach einer Klärung des Modellbegriffs werden solche Entscheidungssituationen analysiert, rationale und formalisierte Modelle diskutiert und ein Beispiel erläutert. Auf dieser Grundlage werden einige praktische Empfehlungen zum wissenschaftlich gestützten ökonomischen Entscheidungsverhalten unter normativen Restriktionen gegeben. (MH)

This book brings together in an efficient and unified way virtually all that has been learned about this intriguing class of games since its appearance on the scene in 1979. The game on discrete sets is reduced to minimal strategy sets on which the payoff matrix has a canonical structure, and the game on intervals is analyzed for all possible pairs of intervals. For most cases, optimal strategies and game value can be explicitly obtained

A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T > 1 and the penalty v > 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory

The reliability of human behavior in situations where cooperation is beneficial for all but is hindered by individual incentives not to cooperate is a central research question in economics and the social sciences. Little is known about how the interaction results of a subject with one partner may affect this subject's behavior when subsequently matched with a new partner. We extend this knowledge by studying the development of cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment. After several rounds, each subject is matched with a new partner. We analyse whether the interaction outcomes with the first partner lead subjects to change their behavior when they interact with the second partner. We focus on niceness as introduced by Axelrod and find statistically significant effects. Mutual cooperation with the first partner is positively correlated with the continuation of a nice strategy, whereas mutual defection leads subjects to give up their nice strategy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This book is written for those seeking a decision theory appropriate for use in serious choices such as insurance. It employs stages of knowledge ahead to track satisfactions and dissatisfactions. From experimental and questionnaire data, people take into account such stages of knowledge ahead satisfactions and dissatisfactions. This means we must go beyond standard decision theories like expected utility or cumulative prospect theory.